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Notes and Comments
The Demand Requirement and the
Business Judgment Rule: Synergistic
Procedural Obstacles to Shareholder
Derivative Suits
I. Introduction: An Overview of the Derivative Suit Dilemma
A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by a cor-
porate shareholder on behalf of the corporation to enforce a cor-
porate right that the officers and directors of the corporation
have failed to enforce.' In bringing a derivative suit, a share-
holder is asserting that the corporation was harmed, that the
corporate officers and directors failed to take action to redress
that harm, and that the corporate cause of action has therefore
accrued to the corporation's shareholders in place of its
directors.'
The derivative action is one of the few means available to
minority shareholders to protect the value of their investment
and to enforce management's obligations to the corporation.3
1. The federal rules of civil procedure define a derivative suit as an "action brought
by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an
unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right
which may properly be asserted by it." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
2. In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882), the Supreme Court delineated the
classic test for when a shareholder may rightfully bring a derivative action: shareholders
may bring suit on behalf of the corporation when the directors have exceeded their au-
thority, are contemplating or have contemplated a fraudulent transaction, or are acting
in their own self-interest to the detriment of the corporation. Id. at 460. The Court also
recognized the right of minority shareholders to bring a derivative action when "the ma-
jority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the
name of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders, and
which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity." Id.
3. As the court pointed out in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), the cost to individual shareholders of bringing a direct action
1
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Historically, derivative suits have played a significant role in de-
terring corporate abuses.4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has called
the derivative action "the chief regulator of corporate
management."'
Despite the important function of derivative suits, they can
also be subject to abuse by unscrupulous shareholders and their
attorneys who may initiate litigation solely to compel a settle-
ment and generate large legal fees. Such suits, commonly called
"strike suits," may be harmful to the corporation; ultimately
their cost is borne by the shareholders, the very group derivative
suits are designed to protect.
7
To control the potential for abuse inherent in the derivative
suit, courts and legislatures have developed procedural rules lim-
iting the circumstances in which derivative suits may be
for injury to the value of their investments would usually outweigh any benefit they
could hope to realize. In addition, a multiplicity of such suits would be judicially ineffi-
cient and wasteful to the corporation. The cost of complying with the requirements for a
class action might also be prohibitively high. Id. at 886-87. See also N. LATrIN, THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 115, at 457 (2d ed. 1971) ("The derivative suit is the minority share-
holders' one effective remedy against management's abuse of its trusteeship.").
4. Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979) ("[S]hareholders' derivative suits can be important weapons for remedying abuses
of corporate management."). Dean Rostow has termed the derivative suit "the most im-
portant procedure the law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corpora-
tions." Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocimTy 48 (E. Mason ed. 1960). See also Dent, The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative
Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 144-45 (1980) (Professor Dent views derivative suits as a
positive alternative to increased governmental intervention as a means of deterring cor-
porate abuses.).
5. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
6. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 887; Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d at 275; Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Note, The Demand and Standing Re-
quirements in Stockholder Actions, 44 UNIv. CHI. L. REV. 168, 172 (1976).
7. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 887; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87
(Del. 1981). The Zapata court clearly stated the problem:
If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest bona fide derivative ac-
tions away from well-meaning derivative plaintiffs through the use of the commit-
tee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of its generally-recog-
nized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors.
... If, on the other hand, corporations are unable to rid themselves of meritless
or harmful litigation and strike suits, the derivative action, created to benefit the
corporation, will produce the opposite, unintended result.
Id. at 786-87.
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brought.' One of the oldest and most important of these proce-
dural rules is the requirement that prior to instituting a deriva-
tive action a shareholder must make a demand on the board of
directors to bring the suit.' Once demand has been made and
rejected, the burden is on the plaintiff shareholder to show why
the directors' decision not to take action should not be respected
by the court.10 Only rarely have courts allowed shareholders to
8. For example, almost every jurisdiction has a contemporaneous ownership require-
ment permitting only shareholders at the time of the challenged transaction to initiate a
derivative suit. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney
1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1983). In addition, the federal rules require that the
plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the interests of similarly situated shareholders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. In many juriidictions, settlement of a derivative action must be
approved by the court. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CODE ANN. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1
(1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963). Many states also have security
for expenses statutes that require derivative plaintiffs to post security to cover the rea-
sonable expenses, including attorneys fees, that the corporation may incur in the litiga-
tion. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Finally, some
states have codified the principle that a successful shareholder plaintiff must account to
the corporation for any proceeds from the suit. See, e.g., id. § 626(e).
9. This requirement, commonly known as the demand requirement, was first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882):
[B]efore the shareholder is permitted in his own name to initiate and conduct a
litigation which usually belongs to the corporation, he should show to the satisfac-
tion of the court that he has exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain,
within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or action in conformity
to his wishes. He must make an earnest, not a simulated effort, with the managing
body of the corporation, to induce remedial action on its part, and this must be
made apparent to the court .... And he must show a case, if this is not done,
where it could not be done, or it was not reasonable to require it.
Id. at 460-61.
In the federal courts, the demand requirement was originally codified in Federal
Equity Rule 94, then in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), which was incorporated
into Federal Rule 23.1 in 1966. Currently, Federal Rule 23.1 requires that "[t]he com-
plaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and .. .the
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R. Civ. P.
23.1.
Every state now requires demand on the corporate board prior to initiation of a
derivative suit. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTuRKc RESTATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02, comment e, at 269 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] ("The rule that demand must be made on the board of
directors, unless it would be futile, is universally recognized by jurisdictions within the
United States, either as a matter of statutory law or judicial interpretation.").
10. To maintain the suit despite director opposition, the shareholder must show
that the suit satisfies the classic test for appropriate derivative action described in
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. at 460. For a list of the Hawes criteria, see supra note 2. In
addition, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts following it, have held that the
19851
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proceed with a derivative suit after a rejected demand."
To prevent directors or controlling shareholders from block-
ing a derivative suit that implicates them in wrongdoing, courts
developed the futility exception to the demand requirement."2
Under this exception, the demand requirement has been excused
when demand would have been "futile," "useless," or "unavail-
ing." In these circumstances, some courts have allowed share-
holders to proceed with the derivative action, despite director
opposition, on the theory that the directors in such cases were
either too self-interested or too controlled by the alleged wrong-
doers to make a valid business decision to dismiss the suit. 4
The effectiveness of the futility exception as a device to pre-
vent self- interested corporate defendants from using a rule of
pleading to bar consideration of the merits of a derivative action
decision whether to enforce a corporate cause of action in the courts is ordinarily a busi-
ness decision that should be left to the discretion of the directors unless the directors are
personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing so that they stand in a "dual
relation" to the corporation, which would impair their business judgment or reflect bad
faith. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917);
Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson
v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 1957).
11. In Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983),
the court denied the corporate board's motion to dismiss the suit after a rejected de-
mand. In explaining its decision, however, the court described the case as one in which
demand was not required. Id. at 888 n.7. For a discussion of the different analytical
approach courts have taken in demand-excused cases, see infra text accompanying notes
13-14, 20-26. See also Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980). Although demand
on the board was never formally made in Galef, the defendants did not raise that as an
issue in the litigation. Instead, the directors moved for summary judgment on the ground
that it was not in the corporation's best interests to pursue the suit. Describing the case
as structurally similar to cases in which demand had been made and rejected, the court
rejected the motion for summary judgment on the ground that the directors seeking to
terminate the lawsuit stood in a "dual relation" to the corporation. Id. at 60-62.
12. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R.R. , 213 U.S. 435 (1909).
For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
13. Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Unter-
meyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978); Nussbacher v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 928 (1976); Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1971); Meltzer v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964); DePinto v.
Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950
(1964); Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955); deHass v.
Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D: Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970).
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has been limited by corporate boards' use of special litigation
committees. These committees have been appointed by corpo-
rate boards threatened with derivative suits that implicate the
directors in a wrongful transaction.15 The committee, which is
usually composed of disinterested directors and outside counsel,
reviews the plaintiff's claims and decides whether it is in the
best interests of the corporation to maintain the suit. In all cases
the special litigation committee has recommended that it was
not in the corporation's best interests to pursue the suit.1
The standard of judicial review that should be applied to a
corporate board's motion to dismiss based on such a recommen-
dation is still unsettled. 17 Some courts have presumed that the
committee was unbiased and independent of the interested di-
rectors or controlling shareholders and have deferred to its rec-
ommendation, dismissing the suit on business judgment grounds
without further judicial scrutiny.' Other courts have been more
15. Cases involving special litigation committees in this context include: Hasan v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d
Cir. 1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Gaines v. Haughton, 645
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d
778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d
259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied., 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F.
Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Rosengarten v. IT
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
16. Cases are listed supra note 15. In two cases, rather than recommending outright
dismissal of the derivative action, the committee suggested alternatives to the suit:
In Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), the
special litigation committee recommended that the suit be discontinued as to 23 of the
defendants. In regard to the remaining seven directors who were senior officers of the
corporation the committee recommended pursuit of a settlement. If a settlement was not
reached, the committee said it would reconsider whether to recommend termination of
that part of the suit as well. Id. at 884.
In Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982), the special litigation commit-
tee recommended that the company seek repayment of damages from the defendants. Id.
at 1028.
17. The issue is controlled by the law of the state of incorporation. Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).
18. This approach, first adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), has been followed by
the courts in Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
1985]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
willing at least to examine a special litigation committee's inde-
pendence and good faith before deciding whether to grant the
board's request to dismiss.19
Most notably, the Delaware Supreme Court has gone the
farthest in establishing standards for judicial scrutiny of a spe-
cial litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss. In
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,0 the Delaware court developed a
new two-part test for evaluating a corporate board's motion to
dismiss based on the recommendation of a special litigation
committee.2'1 First, instead of presuming the committee's inde-
pendence and good faith, Zapata places on the corporation the
burden of proving that the committee acted independently and
in good faith, and made a reasonable investigation of the plain-
tiff's allegations.2 Second, once the board satisfies its initial bur-
den, the court then applies "its own independent business judg-
ment" to determine whether the request to dismiss should be
granted.23 In making this determination, the court would con-
sider matters of law and public policy as well as the corpora-
tion's best interests.2 4 The court noted that it adopted this ap-
proach to thwart the corporation's ability to prematurely
terminate a shareholder action deserving of further considera-
tion." But in what has turned out to be a significant footnote,
the Zapata court limited the application of the second step of
its test to cases in which demand on the board has been ex-
cused. " Thus, to avail themselves of Zapata's standard of in-
(1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Rosengarten v.
ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
19. E.g., Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
20. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
21. Id. at 788-89.
22. Id. at 788.
23. Id. at 789.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 784 n.10. Cases that have analyzed or applied Delaware law after Zapata
include Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983);
Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025(2d Cir. 1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1982); Mills v. Esmark, 573 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa
[Vol. 5:633
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/5
DERIVATIVE SUITS
creased judicial scrutiny of a corporate board's request to dis-
miss, a derivative suit plaintiff must still jump the threshold
demand hurdle.27 As a result of Zapata, then, the crucial ques-
tion for courts applying Delaware law is: when will demand be
excused for futility?
In an attempt to answer that question, this Comment exam-
ines the criteria for demand futility in the federal courts, Dela-
ware, and New York. It suggests that the concept of demand
futility itself is an inadequate and inappropriate means of
preventing corporate directors and controlling shareholders from
blocking derivative suits that implicate them in transactions al-
leged to be injurious to the corporation. Thus, this Comment
suggests that the demand issue should be severed from the stan-
dard of scrutiny to be applied to a corporate board's motion to
dismiss a derivative suit. In lieu of excusing demand, courts
should extend the Zapata test to all cases alleging wrongdoing
by directors or self-dealing by controlling shareholders, thereby
directly limiting the application of the business judgment rule in
the decision to dismiss such cases. This approach would be a
more appropriate and effective means of balancing the interests
of corporate management and shareholders.
1981).
There has been some inconsistency in how the courts in these cases have construed
Zapata. For a discussion of the various interpretations these courts have given to
Zapata, see Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Action Under the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401 (1983).
27. Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982), provides a good example of
the difficulties derivative suit plaintiffs face even after Zapata. In Abramowitz, the
plaintiff shareholder filed a derivative suit against a Delaware corporation naming five of
the corporation's 17 directors as defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had
violated § 10-b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and had misappropriated
corporate funds for their personal use. The plaintiff did not make a demand on the
board, asserting that demand would have been futile. The district court rejected this
assertion and required the plaintiff to make a demand. By the time she did so, the corpo-
ration had appointed an audit committee, which concluded that legal action was not in
the corporation's best interests. Shortly thereafter, the corporation's board unanimously
rejected the plaintiff's demand and moved to dismiss her complaint. Despite an amicus
brief by the S.E.C. urging that courts carefully scrutinize the reasonableness of business
judgment decisions to terminate derivative litigation asserting federal causes of action,
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 4, Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982) (No.
81-7320), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the suit.
The court emphasized that under Zapata such judicial scrutiny would only be applied in
demand excused cases. Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d at 1032-34.
1985]
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II. Background: The Purposes of the Demand Requirement
and the Origins of the Futility Exception
A. The Purposes of the Demand Requirement
Because of its relationship to the business judgment rule
and the threshold hurdle it imposes on derivative plaintiffs, the
demand requirement has been regarded as one of the safeguards
against "strike suits." 8 An equally important rationale for the
demand requirement is that because a derivative suit is brought
on behalf of the corporation, it is the corporate board that
should conduct the suit.2 9 On a more practical level, manage-
ment of the suit by the directors in lieu of the shareholder plain-
tiff may have the benefit of placing all of the corporation's as-
sets - including its access to information, its personnel, its
funds, and its counsel - behind the suit.30 Finally, when de-
mand on the board has been made, the board may be able to
resolve the grievance without costly litigation through an alter-
native method of dispute resolution. 1
B. The Origins of the Futility Exception to the Demand
Requirement
The issue of demand futility was first addressed by the Su-
preme Court in Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susque-
hanna Railroad Co.2 In that case, officers and directors of the
Susquehanna Railroad failed to collect rent owed to the corpora-
28. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
29. Several courts have endorsed the statement in Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517
F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975):
The very purpose of the 'demand' rule is to give the derivative corporation itself
the opportunity to take over a suit which was brought on its behalf in the first
place, and thus to allow the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as
conductors of the corporation's affairs.
Id. at 934, quoted with approval in Kaster v. Modification Sys., 731 F.2d 1014, 1023 (2d
Cir. 1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983); Elfenbein v. Gulf & West-
ern Indus., 590 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1978). See also In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions,
479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984).
30. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d at 248; see also Note, Demand on Directors and
Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARv. L. Rev. 746, 749 (1960).
31. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d at 247; Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Note, supra note 6, at 172.
32. 213 U.S. 435 (1909).
[Vol. 5:633
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tion by the Delaware Company, and the shareholders brought a
derivative suit against the Delaware Company for breaching the
lease agreement.33 Because a majority of the directors of the
Susquehanna Railroad were also officers and directors of the
Delaware Company,3 ' the Court concluded that the antagonism
between the corporate directors and the corporate interest was
unmistakable.3 In such a situation, the Court held, the demand
requirement may be eliminated."
Nearly a half century later, in Cathedral Estates v. Taft
Realty Corp.,37 the Second Circuit attempted to clarify the basic
criteria for excusing demand. Demand, the court held, is pre-
sumptively futile and need not be made when the alleged wrong-
doers control the board or when the directors themselves are
"antagonistic, adversely interested, or involved in the transac-
tion attacked. '"' Although subsequent courts have retained
these same elements as a prerequisite for excusing demand, they
have disagreed regarding what constitutes sufficient control, an-
tagonism, involvement, and self-interest to excuse the demand
requirement.
III. Criteria For Excusing Demand in the Federal Courts
A. Self-Dealing by a Majority of the Board of Directors
All courts that have considered the question have concluded
that simply naming directors as defendants does not automati-
cally excuse demand.3 9 To construe the futility exception differ-
ently would encourage sham pleading by allowing plaintiffs to
circumvent the demand requirement by naming all of the direc-
tors of a corporation as defendants in the derivative action." In
addition, most courts have refused to excuse demand when a
33. Id. at 450.
34. Id. at 443.
35. Id. at 447.
36. Id.
37. 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955).
38. Id. at 88.
39. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1983); Weiss v. Temporary Inv.
Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 943 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 104 S.Ct. 989; Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Heit v. Baird, 567
F.2d 1157, 1162 (1st Cir. 1977).
40. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d at 249.
19851
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:633
majority of the board has merely acquiesced in or approved of
an action alleged to be injurious to the corporation.4' Indeed,
most courts have excused demand for futility only when a ma-
jority of directors have personally benefited from the alleged
wrongdoing.42
Courts in the First and Ninth Circuits have interpreted the
demand requirement even more strictly, requiring plaintiff
41. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d at 248; Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692
F.2d at 943; Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 124 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838
(1982); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d at 785; Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204,
1210 (9th Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d at 1160; In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions,
479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 857 (1973). But see Liboff v. Wolfson,
437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (The complaint that was held to fully meet the require-
ments of Rule 23.1 alleged only that "[tihe majority of said directors participated, ap-
proved of and acquiesced in said transaction."); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048
(1974) (The allegation that the directors participated. or acquiesced in the challenged
transaction was held sufficient to excuse demand.); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp.,
330 F.2d 946, 948 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964) (Demand was excused
where three of five directors approved of or negligently tolerated blatant misuses of cor-
porate funds for the personal benefit of the other two directors.).
In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 did not apply to actions, such as Grossman
and Weiss, brought under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-35(b) (1983), because such actions are not really derivative under the terms of the
statute. Although Daily Income Fund overrules Grossman and Weiss with regard to the
demand requirement, the Court's analysis of the criteria for excusing demand are, never-
theless, still applicable to shareholders' derivative suits brought under other statutes.
42. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d at 249 (demand not futile where only five of 11
directors were alleged to have received impermissible grants of stock); Weiss v. Tempo-
rary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d at 943 (demand not futile where four of the six directors, who
approved allegedly excessive advisory fees, were not "interested" under the terms of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1983)); Grossman v. Johnson,
674 F.2d at 123-24 (demand not futile where only three of the eight directors were affili-
ated with the investment advisor charged with profiting from excessive fees paid by a
mutual fund); Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d at 1210 (demand not excused
where none of the alleged wrongdoings particularly favored any member of the board);
Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d at 1160 (1st Cir. 1977) (demand not excused where only three of
seven directors were alleged to have benefited from the improper issuance of new stock);
In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d at 264 (demand not excused where a ma-
jority of the directors were not affiliated with investment advisors alleged to have re-
ceived excessive management fees). But see Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust,
580 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1978) (demand excused where two of the four trustees of a
mutual fund were principal owners of an investment advisor alleged to have received
excessive fees from the fund); Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d at 948 (de-
mand excused where only two of the five directors personally profited from blatant mis-
use of corporate funds, which was approved of or negligently tolerated by the other three
directors).
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shareholders to show not only that the challenged transaction
benefited the majority directors, but also that it was "completely
undirected to a corporate purpose."43 Thus, in Heit v. Baird,4
for example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals placed on the
plaintiff the burden of proving that the sale of over $350,000
worth of stock to three board members for an initial outlay of
only $10,750 had been effected solely to thwart a potential con-
test for control of the corporation by a minority stockholder. 6
The court termed conclusory the plaintiff's allegations that the
directors had authorized the stock issue in order to retain con-
trol of the corporation. 6 Moreover, the court itself suggested a
number of permissible reasons the corporation may have had for
issuing the stock.'7 Perhaps, the court posited, the transaction
had been designed to increase the loyalty and commitment of
the directors who benefited from the favorable financing ar-
rangement while discouraging a "raid" by individuals who might
harm the corporation.' Quoting an earlier First Circuit case, In
re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions," the court described the
sale of stock as a transaction that, although potentially vulnera-
ble to criticism, could be thought to serve the interests of the
company.6
In Lewis v. Curtis,51 the Third Circuit specifically rejected
the Heit approach. 52 The Lewis court noted that the share-
holder's complaint described in detail a scheme, including a
$750,000 payoff to an outside "raider," by all of the directors of
Hammermill Paper Company to retain control of the corpora-
tion . 3 The court said that the plaintiff shareholder need not al-
lege the transaction could not, under any circumstances, have
43. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d at 1161; In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d at
265; Greenspun v. Del E. Webb. Corp., 634 F.2d at 1210.
44. 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 1161-62.
46. Id. at 1161.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
50. Id. at 265.
51. 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
52. Id. at 786. "To the extent that Heit requires that it be alleged that a majority of
directors be involved in a facially improper transaction before demand will be excused,
we decline to follow it." Id.
53. Id. at 784.
1985]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
been the product of business judgment. 4 Rather, the court con-
cluded, in such a situation demand should be excused and
"trial - or at least embarking on the road to trial - is re-
quired. To impose the bar of the demand requirement would
largely be to create a pleading defense to a fact dispute."55 To
proceed with the suit without demand, the plaintiff shareholder
would still be required to show that a majority of the directors
had been involved in and profited from the challenged transac-
tion and that the transaction was harmful to the corporation;
the plaintiff would not have to show that the transaction could
not have served a legitimate corporate purpose in the business
judgment of the directors.58
B. Self-Dealing by a Controlling Shareholder
The Supreme Court's discussion in Delaware & Hudson in-
dicated that, even absent specific allegations of self-dealing by a
majority of the board, the Court would excuse demand for futil-
ity if the plaintiff shareholder could demonstrate control of the
board by the alleged wrongdoers.5 7 The issue of control, how-
ever, is "an intensely factual one."58 In most cases, courts have
not found sufficient evidence of control to warrant excusing de-
mand. Most recently, in Kaster v. Modification Systems,60 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to recognize demand
futility when the alleged wrongdoer not only owned seventy-one
percent of the closed corporation's stock, but also nominated all
but one of the corporation's directors, and was President and
Chairman of the Board."
54. Id. at 786.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany and Susquehanna R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 449
(1909).
58. Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 968 (3d Cir. 1976).
59. See, e.g., Kaster v. Modification Sys., 731 F.2d 1014, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1984);
Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d at 1209; Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus.,
590 F.2d 445, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1978); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d at 968; In re Kauffman Mut.
Fund Actions, 479 F.2d at 264. But see deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp.
809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
60. 731 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 1015-16. In a strong dissent to the majority opinion, Judge Friendly as-
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C. Antagonism to the Suit by the Board
Although Delaware & Hudson indicated that antagonism
between corporate directors and derivative suit plaintiffs was a
ground for excusing demand, only one appellate court has ex-
cused demand for that reason.62 The difficulty, it seems, is in
finding a standard by which antagonism can be measured. Both
the First and Third Circuits have refused to find antagonism to
the derivative action in the board of director's resistance to the
suit." Thus, in In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions64 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals termed it "classic bootstrap" to infer
hostility from the directors' efforts to seek dismissal of the
suit." Similarly, in Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund,
Inc. ,66 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision
in Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.,6 7 and
stated that "futility... 'must be gauged at the time the deriva-
tive action is commenced, not afterward with the benefit of
hindsight.' "68
IV. Criteria for Excusing Demand in Delaware and New York
A. Delaware
Although Zapata requires greater scrutiny of a corporate
board's motion to dismiss a derivative suit in demand-excused
cases than in demand- refused cases, 9 Zapata left unanswered
the crucial threshold question: when may demand be excused for
sessed the allegations of the plaintiff and concluded that "[ilf ever there were a case for
applying the futility exception ...this is it." Id. at 1023.
62. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 878 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (demand excused where the board took ac-
tion to dismiss an identical suit in a different jurisdiction). The court asserted that "the
message is loud and clear that under no circumstances would the board of directors have
approved the corporation bringing the action." Id. at 879.
63. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d at 943; Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d at
276; Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d at 1160; In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d at 264.
64. 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
65. Id. at 264.
66. 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 989.
67. 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
68. Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d at 943 (quoting Cramer v. GTE, 582
F.2d at 276).
69. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See supra note 27 and
text accompanying notes 20-27.
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futility? 70 It was not until three years after Zapata, in Aronson
v. Lewis,7' that the Delaware Supreme Court answered that
question. In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court established
a strict standard for interpreting the demand requirement and
linked their analysis of the demand issue to the business judg-
ment rule." Demand will not be excused for futility, the court
held, unless the facts alleged in the complaint create a reasona-
ble doubt that a majority of the directors were disinterested and
that the challenged transaction resulted from the valid exercise
of their business judgment.74
Aronson involved a derivative suit that challenged agree-
ments providing interest-free loans and a lifetime consulting
contract to a director who not only owned forty-seven percent of
the corporation's stock, but also had selected each of the corpo-
ration's officers and directors. 5 The court rejected plaintiff's
contention that this director so dominated and controlled the
board that demand would have been futile.7" The court held that
mere board approval of a transaction benefiting a substantial,
but nonmajority, shareholder will not vitiate the presumption
under the business judgment rule that the board's actions were
taken in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.7
Thus, in Delaware the business judgment rule enables directors
to require that demand be made in almost all cases, and then
once demand is made and rejected the business judgment rule
allows directors to dismiss the derivative suit without further
court review.
70. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807 (Del. 1984).
71. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 807-08. Prior to Aronson, the Delaware Chancery
Court dealt with the demand issue in three cases: Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch.
1983); Bergstein v. Texas Int'l Co., 453 A.2d 467 (Del. Ch. 1982) appeal denied, 461 A.2d
695 (Del. 1983); Stepak v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388 (Del. Ch. 1981). All of these cases adopted
the standard, similar to the standard adopted by the majority of federal courts, that in
order to excuse demand a majority of directors must have personally benefited from the
challenged transaction.
73. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812.
74. Id. at 814.
75. Id. at 808-09.
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id.
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B. New York
New York courts have been more lenient than Delaware
courts in excusing demand for futility.7 8 In the leading case,
Barr v. Wackman7 9 the New York Court of Appeals specifically
rejected the proposition that allegations of director fraud or self-
interest are prerequisites for excusing demand in a shareholder
derivative suit.80 Even when a majority of the directors have not
personally profited from the challenged transactions, the court
stated, such directors may still be held liable for breach of their
duties of due care and diligence to the corporation. 1 In these
instances, it would be unlikely for them to prosecute an action
that might raise questions concerning their liability.82 Thus, the
court concluded that specific allegations of board participation
in or approval of a wrongdoing may suffice to excuse demand.8
This approach to the demand issue is very different from that
taken by Delaware and the majority of federal courts, in which
more than board acquiescence in or approval of an alleged
wrongdoing is required to excuse demand.84
V. The Inadequacy of the Concept of Demand Futility
A. A Critique of New York's Liberal Approach to Demand
Futility
Liberalizing the requirements for excusing demand, as New
York has done,86 may be one possible method of avoiding the
"death sentence" 86 for the derivative suit that almost always oc-
curs when demand on the board is not excused. 7 There are,
however, several problems with this approach. First, it ignores
some of the useful purposes that demand may serve, even when
some of the directors have allegedly acquiesced in or approved
78. See Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
79. 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
80. Id. at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83 Id. at 381, 329 N.E.2d at 188, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
84. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
86. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Cri-
tique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 997.
87. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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of the challenged transaction."8 Demand gives the directors no-
tice of shareholder grievances and thus provides them with the
opportunity to redress those grievances. In addition, the New
York approach ignores the possibility that even directors who
have acquiesced in or approved of corporate wrongdoing may
still do their duty on behalf of the corporation if asked to do
so.89 As many courts have declared, directors who are not them-
selves accused of self-dealing should be given the option of tak-
ing over a derivative suit and occupying their normal position as
conductors of the corporation's affairs." If the board decides
that a derivative suit is not in the best interest of the corpora-
tion, it should at least be given the opportunity to articulate the
reasons for that decision before costly litigation is initiated.
B. Demand Futility in the Federal Courts and Delaware: A
Threshold to Dismissal
Although New York's liberal approach to excusing demand
is an undesirable method of preventing interested directors from
terminating derivative suits implicating them in wrongdoing, the
approach taken by the federal courts and Delaware is inade-
quate to protect the interests of shareholders. The high degree
of self-interest required to excuse demand in these jurisdic-
tions,91 coupled with the application of the business judgment
rule to a board's request to dismiss when demand has not been
excused,92 have prevented most shareholder suits from proceed-
ing beyond the pleading stage to a discussion of the merits.9 8
88. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
89. In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973); Brooks v. American Export Indus., 68 F.R.D. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
90. See cases cited supra note 29. As one court noted, underlying the demand re-
quirement is the "notion that a shareholder's suit is to be resorted to as a last alterna-
tive, and that the corporation is given every possibility to sue in its own name."
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 91 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting 3B J.
MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE V 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1980)).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 39-77.
92. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. This result contrasts sharply with
the goals of Federal Rule 23.1, which governs the procedural aspects of derivative suits in
the federal courts, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966). In Surowitz, which dealt with the verification requirement of
Rule 23(b) (now Rule 23.1), the Court said:
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Thus, if the purpose of the futility exception to the demand re-
quirement is to prevent self-interested corporate defendants
from using a rule of pleading to bar consideration of the merits
of a derivative action implicating them in a wrongdoing, it has
failed to accomplish this goal.
In this regard, the difficulties faced by derivative plaintiffs
have been compounded by the ability of defendant directors to
circumvent a plaintiffs allegation of demand futility by ap-
pointing a special litigation committee to review the share-
holder's request that suit be brought against them. The problem
with special litigation committees is that they are inherently af-
fected by a structural bias that makes their independence and
good faith more theoretical than real. 4 Inside directors, who are
also corporate officers, may depend on named defendants to de-
The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials,
not through summary dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion. These
rules were designed in large part to get away from some of the old procedural
booby traps which common-law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated liti-
gants from ever having their day in court. If rules of procedure work as they
should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should as
nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudica-
tion on the merits.
Id at 373.
94. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984). In
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Special litigation committees created to evaluate the merits of certain litigation
are appointed by defendants to that litigation. It is not cynical to expect that such
committees will tend to view derivative actions against the other directors with
skepticism. Indeed, if the involved directors expected any result other than a rec-
ommendation of termination at least as to them, they would probably never estab-
lish the committee. The conflict of interest. . . is hardly eliminated by the crea-
tion of special litigation committee.
Id. at 888.
The Delaware Supreme Court also clearly articulated its concern with the possibilty
of structural bias in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981): "[W]e must
be mindful that directors are passing judgement on fellow directors in the same corpora-
tion. . . . The question naturally arises whether a 'there but for the grace of God go I'
empathy might not play a role." Id. at 787. Commentators who have also voiced concern
about the structural bias of special litigation committees include: Coffee & Schwartz,
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Re-
form, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 217, 283 nn.124-26 (1981); Cox, supra note 86, at 962-63, 972,
1009-11; Dent, supra note 4, at 110-17; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative
Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600, 619-22 (1980).
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termine their salaries, fringe benefits, and future promotions."5
The independence of outside directors or supposedly detached
and disinterested special committee members may also be ques-
tionable, especially when they have been appointed to their posi-
tions by defendants named in the lawsuit9 8 Even when they
have not been appointed by the defendants, outside directors
may be dependent on the alleged wrongdoers for information.9 7
Moreover, outside directors, who are usually corporate execu-
tives themselves, may be reluctant to approve a suit against col-
leagues with whom they may have future business dealings.9 As
the Second Circuit recognized in Lasker v. Burks,99 "[it is ask-
ing too much of human nature to expect that the disinterested
directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of
their colleagues in a situation where an adverse decision would
be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the
individuals concerned." 100
VI. Stricter Scrutiny of the Request to Dismiss a Derivative
Suit: The ALI Proposal
The American Law Institute has analyzed the unique
problems presented by derivative litigation, and proposed a so-
lution that attempts to balance the corporate directors' need to
retain control of corporate management with the shareholders'
interest in corporate accountability. 10 1 The proposal is aimed at
preventing a corporate board from obtaining summary dismissal
of derivative actions that implicate the officers or directors in
95. Dent, supra note 4, at 111.
96. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 888. See supra note 94; Dent, supra note 4, at 112.
97. For example, in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo.
1968), modified and afl'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1978), the court found that the three
outside directors had taken only a limited interest in the corporation and had little
knowledge of the value or nature of its assets, and the extent of its earnings and liabili-
ties. The outside directors, the court concluded, were thus dependent on the defen-
dant - who was chairman of the board, president, and chief executive officer of the
corporation - for information. Id. at 814. See also L. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
§ 5.08, at 5-82 (1983) ("Management's power over the flow of information is just as sig-
nificant in controlling the outside directors as it is in controlling public shareholders.").
98. Dent, supra note 4, at 112.
99. 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
100. Id. at 1212.
101. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, §§ 7.02-.03.
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wrongdoing. First, the ALI suggests that the demand issue
should be severed from the standard of scrutiny to be applied to
a corporate board's motion to dismiss a derivative suit.102 Next,
it urges courts to adopt a strict standard for excusing demand. 10 3
Finally, even when demand is made and refused, in all cases al-
leging wrongdoing by a corporate fiduciary or self-dealing by a
controlling shareholder, the ALI would require a corporate
board that requests dismissal to bear the burden of justifying its
request.1 04 In such cases, the court would apply its own business
judgment to determine whether to grant the request.10 5 Thus,
the ALI proposal adopts the approach to dismissal of derivative
suits taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,06 but it extends both steps of the Zapata test to
demand-refused as well as demand-excused cases.
A. Analysis of the ALI Proposal
1. The Demand Requirement
The ALI proposal relies heavily on the analytical framework
provided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Galef v. Al-
exander.107 Galef distinguishes between the decision to excuse
demand and the decision to grant a board's request to dismiss a
derivative suit: "A determination that directors are not so inter-
ested in the underlying transaction as to excuse demand on
them does not mean that they are so disinterested as to enable
them to eliminate the lawsuit." 10 8 This approach encourages de-
mand, providing dutiful directors with an opportunity to take
remedial action without foreclosing the possibility that a share-
holder could still pursue a derivative suit if the directors fail to
102. Id. § 7.02, comment e, at 270.
103. Id. at 271.
104. Id. § 7.03(c).
105. Id. § 7.03(c)(ii).
106. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
107. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 59. The First Circuit, which has taken a strict approach to excusing de-
mand, also recognized the distinction when it said: "Resort to the board, even assuming
the directors should turn down plaintiff's demand, would not necessarily preclude suit
thereafter. Participation that is insufficient to excuse demand may nonetheless disqualify
directors from barring a derivative suit." Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.6 (1st Cir.
1977).
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take action after demand is made. As the Galef court observed,
"[t]he rationale of the cases holding that demand must be made
even if the directors have been or may be made defendants, is
not that the directors can preclude suit despite being defen-
dants, but rather that they might cause the corporation to pur-
sue the suit despite being defendants." 10 9
2. The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of the
Board's Motion to Dismiss a Derivative Suit
The concept of judicial scrutiny of a board's request to dis-
miss a derivative suit alleging wrongdoing by a corporate fiduci-
ary or self-dealing by a controlling shareholder is central to the
ALI proposal. 110 Several commentators and some courts have
suggested that "[t]he considerations that support judicial defer-
ence to a commercial decision of the board are not present when
the directors' decision pertains to the continuation of a deriva-
tive suit." '
Traditionally, the business judgment rule has been a means
of insulating corporate directors and officers from liability for
business decisions made with due care and in good faith.1 ' In
this sense, the business judgment rule has been termed a "de-
fense." Because the issue in evaluating a board's motion to dis-
miss a derivative suit is the propriety of the directors' decision
to terminate the suit, not their liability for that decision, the
business judgment rule should be irrelevant to the court's evalu-
ation.113 Moreover, the policies underlying the rule - the need
109. Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 59.
110. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03(c), at 298-300. The ALI correctly
distinguishes between derivative actions against third parties or low level corporate em-
ployees and actions alleging wrongdoing by corporate fiduciaries or self-dealing by a con-
trolling shareholder. The ALI recognizes that the former present little potential for
abuse, and the Institute therefore proposes a "business judgment standard" of review for
decisions by corporate boards to terminate such actions. Id. comment a, at 304.
111. Cox, supra note 86, at 1009. See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 280-
84; Dent, supra note 4, at 135-36; Note, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative Suit
Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 886 n.4 (1981).
112. Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 57.
113. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 782. See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra
note 94, at 281; Dent, supra note 4, at 135; Note, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative
Suit Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 885, 885 n.4 (1981).
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to encourage entrepreneurship and commercial risk-tak-
ing - are only peripherally related to a board's decision to seek
termination of a derivative suit. 1 4 Perhaps most important, the
decision whether to dismiss a derivative suit does not require
the same specific business or economic expertise that would be
required to assess other more strictly commercial decisions that
have traditionally been protected by the business judgment
rule."' On the contrary, determining whether a lawsuit should
proceed has always been the province of the courts."" Indeed, as
the Delaware Supreme Court observed in Zapata, "'[ulnder our
system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits
of litigation.' '"
3. The Burden of Proof Issue
Another possibly controversial aspect of the ALI's proposal
is its suggestion that the burden of proof should be on the cor-
poration to show the business justification for its request to dis-
miss." This position seems consistent, however, with the gen-
eral rule in all other types of litigation that the party moving to
dismiss bears the burden of persuasion with regard to that mo-
tion." 9 On a more practical level, this approach to the burden of
114. Professors Coffee and Schwartz point out that the business judgment rule
evolved to protect ordinary business decisions made under time pressure. The rule ac-
knowledges the uncertainties of the marketplace and recognizes that in business, exces-
sive prudence can sometimes be detrimental. In contrast to ordinary business decisions,
the decision whether to terminate a lawsuit can and should be made with greater deliber-
ation, and therefore does not need the protection of the business judgment rule. Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 94, at 281-83. The ALI has also evaluated the business judgment
rule in the context of ordinary business decisions. See Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations § 4.01-.03 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1984).
115. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
116. As the Second Circuit noted in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 888, "it can hardly be
argued that terminating a lawsuit is an area in which courts have no special aptitude."
Indeed, in Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the court deals regularly
and competently with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property, approval of
settlements - issues that are similar to those raised by the request to dismiss a deriva-
tive suit. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788.
117. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 789 n.18 (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn,
413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980)).
118. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.03, comment a, at 308.
119. In some respects, the board's assertion of a business justification for dismissal
21
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proof question recognizes that at the pre-discovery stage, when
the motion to dismiss is made, the corporation has greater access
than the plaintiff shareholder to the information required to
substantiate or disprove the board's justification for dismissal. 20
4. The Concern with Strike Suits
Beneath the deference given to corporate requests for dis-
missal of derivative suits is the desire to discourage "strike
suits.' 121 Perhaps the strongest argument against deferring to a
corporation's decision to seek dismissal of a derivative suit as a
method of deterring strike suits is that it allows the directors,
who are themselves a party to the suit, to determine whether the
suit is indeed a "strike suit." Moreover, various restrictions have
already been placed on derivative suits to prevent their abuse. 22
is similar to the assertion of an affirmative defense, which the defendant has the burden
of pleading. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 948 (3d ed. 1984). ("In most cases, the
party who has the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence
and of persuading the jury of its existence as well.") Some courts have compared the
board's motion to dismiss with a motion for summary judgment in which the moving
party has the burden of proof. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 892; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d at 788.
120. Cox, supra note 86, at 1008; MCCORMICK, supra note 120, at 950 ("A doctrine
often repeated by the Courts is that where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly
in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of proving the issue.").
121. See supra text accompany note 8. See also Dent, supra note 4, at 137-40.
122. Not all of these restrictions are effective or desirable. One restriction that has
been critized by some commentators is the requirement, adopted in a substantial minor-
ity of states, that plaintiffs post security at the outset of litigation to cover the reasona-
ble expenses, including attorney's fees, that may be incurred in the action. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-223 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-
121(3) (1973) (excludes attorneys' fees); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.147(3) (West Supp. 1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-6(3) (West Supp. 1983- 1984);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516B
(Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-718(f) (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT.
ANN., art. 5.14(c) (Vernon 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.460 (1969); W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-103 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(4) (West 1957); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-141.1
(Cum. Supp. 1984). In 1982, the security for expenses provision was deleted from the
Model Business Corporation Act. HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 372, at
1089 n.1 (1983).
The ALI has criticized security for expenses statutes because: (1) they tend to chill
meritorous as well as non-meritorious suits, (2) they often do not curb the abuses they
were intended to curtail because they can be easily circumvented, and (3) they discrimi-
nate unfairly between large and small shareholders because generally their provisions do
not apply to shareholders owning more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any
class. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, § 7.02, comment g, at 275-77. See also Cof-
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/5
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Thus, for example, in the federal courts, as well as in many state
courts, settlement of a derivative suit must be approved by the
court.12 3 In addition, in the majority of derivative actions, recov-
ery accrues to the corporation, not to the individual share-
holder.'2 4 New York and Wisconsin have codified the principle
that plaintiff shareholders must account to the corporation for
any proceeds resulting from a compromise, settlement, or judg-
ment in any derivative action.125
VII. Conclusion
The basic task of the courts in shareholder litigation is to
balance the right of the corporate board to manage the affairs of
the corporation with the right of the shareholders to protect
their interests without being "unfairly trampled on by the board
of directors.'126 Currently, the high degree of self- interest re-
quired to excuse demand, combined with the deference given to
a board's request for dismissal of a derivative suit when demand
has not been excused, have shifted the balance in favor of corpo-
rate directors who can effectively use a procedural rule to pre-
clude any consideration of the merits of a shareholder action. As
a result, shareholders with legitimate grievances may be denied
access to the courts to protect their corporate interests. Applica-
fee & Schwartz, supra note 94, at 314-15; Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders'
Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50 (1968).
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides that "the action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court."
124. See, e.g., Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253-54, 2 A.2d 904, 912-13
(1938) ("Generally, where the action is a derivative one, brought for the benefit of a
going corporation, equitable principles demand that the theory of the action be recog-
nized and that the whole recoverable amount be decreed to be paid to the corporation
In limited circumstances, such as when the corporation is no longer in existence or
when an award to the corporation would revert to the wrongdoers, courts have awarded
individual shareholders a pro rata share of the recovery in derivative actions. See, e.g.,
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See
generally Grenier, Pro Rata Recovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes of Action as
a Means of Achieving Corporate Justice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1965 (1962); NOTE,
Individual Pro Rata Recovery in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1314
(1956); Note, Shareholders' Right to Direct Recovery in Derivative Suits, 17 Wyo. L.J.
208 (1963).
125. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(3)
(West 1957).
126. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). See supra note 7.
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tion by the courts of a strict standard for excusing demand, cou-
pled with greater scrutiny of all requests to dismiss derivative
actions alleging wrongdoing by corporate directors or self-deal-
ing by controlling shareholders, would help to restore the deli-
cate balance between the rights of the shareholders and the
rights of corporate management. Most important, such an ap-
proach would enable the derivative suit to retain "its generally-
recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of policing
boards of directors.' ' 27
Carole F. Wilder
127. Id. at 786.
[Vol. 5:633
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/5
